Britain Imports 40% of Its Energy. Here's Why.

The £24.3 Billion Question

Britain’s energy import dependency crisis is one of the most underreported policy failures of the past two decades. We now import 40% of our energy, costing £24.3 billion in 2024 alone, despite having been a net energy exporter as recently as 2004.

The numbers are stark:

40% energy dependency (2023) exposing Britain to price shocks and geopolitical risk
£24.3bn annual import bill (2024), 38% higher than previous peak
Nuclear output collapsed: 100 TWh (late 1990s) to 41 TWh (2024)
Over 80% of “green” biomass imported from North America
Import dependency rose exactly as nuclear capacity fell

This isn’t about climate denial or anti-renewable ideology. It’s about energy security, economic sovereignty, and the consequences of dismantling baseload capacity without replacement. Let’s examine how we got here and what it means for Britain’s future.

The Numbers: Britain’s Energy Import Crisis

Britain’s energy landscape has fundamentally transformed over the past two decades, and not in the way most people think. While renewable energy deployment has reached record levels, with renewables providing 54.5% of electricity generation in Q2 2025, our dependence on imported energy has simultaneously soared to dangerous levels.

The current state (2023-2024 data):

Overall import dependency: 40% of total energy supply
Annual import cost: £24.3 billion (2024)
Historical context: This is 38% higher than the previous peak in 2012

But these aggregate numbers hide a more complex and concerning picture. When we break down imports by fuel type, the strategic vulnerability becomes clear:

Natural Gas: 45% imported Despite being an island nation surrounded by North Sea reserves, nearly half our gas now comes from foreign sources. Predominantly from Norway, but increasingly from global LNG markets where we compete with Asia and Europe for supply.

Oil Products: 44% imported Our refining capacity has declined, and North Sea oil production has fallen 75% from its 2000 peak. We’re now heavily dependent on international oil markets.

Biomass Pellets: Over 80% imported Here’s where the official statistics become absurd. Britain classifies biomass as “renewable energy,” yet we import over 80% of wood pellets from North America (primarily the United States and Canada, with 81% from North America in 2018). These pellets are shipped across the Atlantic, burned at Drax power station in Yorkshire, and counted toward our renewable energy targets. The carbon accounting is questionable; the import dependency is undeniable.

Electricity: 24 TWh imported net While Britain exports some electricity, we’re a net importer, particularly during periods of high demand or low wind generation. We depend on interconnectors to France (nuclear-powered) and the Netherlands.

The Historical Timeline: From Exporter to Importer

To understand how dire this situation has become, we need to look at Britain’s energy trajectory over the past 40 years:

1981: Britain becomes a net energy exporter following North Sea oil and gas discoveries. Energy independence seemed assured.

1999: North Sea production peaks. At this point, Britain was producing enough energy not just for domestic use but for export. We had genuine energy security.

2004: Britain becomes a net energy importer. This marked a critical turning point, one that received far less attention than it deserved.

2014: Approximately 65% of electricity generation fuel was sourced from foreign suppliers. The decline was accelerating.

2024: 40% overall energy dependency, with 50% of electricity supply relying on imports or imported fuel.

The trend is unmistakable: we’ve gone from energy independence to dangerous dependency in just two decades. But why?

The Nuclear Decline Nobody Talks About

If you search for explanations of Britain’s rising import dependency, you’ll find plenty of discussion about North Sea depletion, renewable energy transitions, and global energy markets. What you won’t find is adequate discussion of the elephant in the room: the collapse of Britain’s nuclear generating capacity.

The numbers are damning:

Late 1990s: ~100 TWh of nuclear electricity generation 2024: 41 TWh of nuclear generation Decline: 59 TWh (nearly 60% reduction)

To put this in perspective, 59 TWh represents roughly the total electricity consumption of Scotland and Wales combined. This isn’t a minor adjustment. It’s the equivalent of shutting down the power supply for millions of homes.

Quarter 2, 2025 alone: Nuclear output fell 13% compared to the previous year, dropping to just 9.9 TWh. Nearly all remaining UK nuclear sites experienced outages during this period.

The Replacement That Never Happened

Nuclear power plants were always going to age out. That’s not the scandal. The scandal is that we had decades to plan their replacement—and we didn’t.

Instead, the official narrative went something like this: “Renewables will replace nuclear. Wind and solar are cheaper. We don’t need baseload power anymore—we’ll have batteries and flexibility.”

How’s that working out?

Renewable deployment: Undeniably successful. From ~10 TWh in the late 1990s to 145 TWh in 2024. An impressive fourteenfold increase.

Import dependency: Also increased. From net exporter to 40% import dependency.

These two facts coexist because renewable energy, for all its benefits, cannot provide what nuclear provided: 24/7 baseload power that doesn’t depend on weather, doesn’t require fuel imports, and doesn’t need gas backup spinning in the background.

The Correlation Everyone Ignores

Plot two lines on a graph:

UK nuclear generating capacity over time
UK energy import dependency over time

They’re almost perfect inverses. As nuclear declined, imports rose. This isn’t coincidence. It’s causation.

When you shut down a nuclear power plant generating 1 GW of baseload capacity, you can’t replace it with 1 GW of wind nameplate capacity. Why? Because wind capacity factor in the UK averages around 30%. You need roughly 3 GW of wind capacity to generate the same annual electricity as 1 GW of nuclear, and even then, you need gas backup for when the wind doesn’t blow.

That gas backup? Increasingly imported.

The Renewable Promise vs. The Import Reality

This is where the analysis becomes uncomfortable for conventional environmental narratives. Britain has achieved remarkable renewable energy deployment (arguably world-leading). So why are we importing more energy than ever?

The Intermittency Problem

Wind and solar are intermittent by nature. In Q2 2025, wind generated 17.9 TWh (a substantial contribution). But wind output can vary from near-zero to oversupply within the same week. Solar generated 7.1 TWh in Q2 2025, but solar output in British winter is negligible.

This creates a fundamental problem: the grid needs stable baseload power. When renewables can’t provide it (which is often), something else must. In Britain’s case, that “something else” is increasingly imported gas.

Current gas dependency: Gas provided 15.2 TWh in Q2 2025. While this is lower than previous years (wind overtook gas for the first time in Q2 2025), gas remains the critical backup.

Gas import dependency: 45% of our gas is imported.

So the math becomes clear: Record renewable deployment → Still need gas backup → Gas is increasingly imported → Import dependency rises.

The Biomass Deception

Britain’s renewable energy statistics include a category that deserves scrutiny: biomass. Drax power station in Yorkshire burns wood pellets to generate electricity, and this is classified as “renewable” and “sustainable.”

The reality:

Over 80% of biomass fuel is imported, primarily from the United States and Canada
Wood pellets are shipped across the Atlantic (a 3,000+ mile journey)
The carbon accounting assumes trees are replanted, but lifecycle emissions are disputed
We’ve replaced domestic coal with imported wood and called it “green”

When official statistics tout Britain’s renewable energy success, they’re including fuel that travels further than Saudi oil. This is import dependency with a green label.

Storage: The Solution That Isn’t (Yet)

The standard response to intermittency concerns is: “We’ll build battery storage.” And indeed, battery deployment is growing. But the scale required is staggering.

To replace the grid stability that nuclear provided, Britain would need storage capable of covering:

Multi-day wind droughts (common in British winter)
Seasonal variation in solar output
Unexpected outages in renewable generation

Current battery storage capacity in the UK: Measured in gigawatt-hours. Required storage for true energy independence: Measured in terawatt-hours.

We’re not even in the same order of magnitude. And batteries at that scale don’t exist at commercially viable prices. They might in the future, but they don’t today, and we shut down nuclear plants anyway.

The Small Modular Reactor Response: Too Little, Too Late?

To the government’s credit, they’ve finally recognized that nuclear capacity needs to be restored. In 2025, the UK government selected Rolls-Royce for Britain’s first Small Modular Reactor (SMR) deployment at Wylfa, with over £2.5 billion pledged for the overall SMR programme in the current Spending Review period.

The official vision:

Target: Power for 3 million homes from SMRs
“Golden age” of nuclear energy
Planning reforms (February 2025) to fast-track development
Factory-built standardization to reduce costs

The sobering reality:

First SMR unlikely to be operational before 2035
First reactors will be “unavoidably expensive”
We still need to maintain existing aging nuclear fleet
Regulatory approval processes remain slow

The case for SMRs is sound:

Energy independence: Nuclear fuel is not imported in meaningful quantities
Baseload capacity: 24/7 generation regardless of weather
Grid stability: Provides the firm power renewables can’t
Jobs: Highly-skilled employment that can’t be outsourced
Complements renewables: Wind/solar for variable generation, nuclear for baseload

But here’s the critical point: Even if the SMR program succeeds, we’ve lost 20+ years of energy independence.

Britain had operating nuclear capacity. We had the expertise. We had the industrial base. We chose to let it decline without replacement. The 2024 import bill (£24.3 billion) represents money that could have built multiple large nuclear plants or dozens of SMRs.

Instead, we sent that money overseas and called it an energy transition.

The Real Cost of Import Dependency

£24.3 billion per year sounds abstract. Let’s make it concrete.

Economic Costs

Direct expenditure: £24.3bn leaving the British economy annually. That’s roughly equivalent to the entire budget of the Department for Education. Every year. Gone.

Lost economic multiplier: When we generate energy domestically, the money circulates in the UK economy (paying British workers, British suppliers, British services). When we import energy, that multiplier effect happens elsewhere.

Price volatility exposure: Domestic energy production has relatively stable costs. Imported energy prices fluctuate wildly based on global markets, geopolitics, and currency exchange rates. Britain is now exposed to price shocks we could have avoided.

Currency risk: Energy is typically priced in dollars. When sterling weakens, our import bill rises even if global energy prices remain constant.

Security Risks

Energy import dependency isn’t just economic. It’s a strategic vulnerability:

Geopolitical exposure: We’re dependent on gas from Norway (stable but limited), LNG from Qatar and the US (subject to global competition), and electricity from interconnectors to France and the Netherlands. Any disruption (whether from conflict, political decisions, or infrastructure failure) directly impacts British energy security.

Supply disruption risk: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how quickly European energy security can be threatened. While Britain is less dependent on Russian gas than some European neighbors, we compete in the same global markets. When European demand for LNG spikes, prices rise for everyone.

Electricity import vulnerability: Interconnectors are efficient when they work, but they’re single points of failure. A cable fault, a political dispute, or a coordinated cyber-attack could sever our connections precisely when we need them most.

Strategic weakness: Adversaries don’t need to attack Britain directly to damage our economy. They need only disrupt global energy markets or target our import infrastructure.

Opportunity Cost

Perhaps the most galling aspect is what £24.3 billion per year could have bought:

Nuclear capacity: Hinkley Point C is budgeted at £33-35 billion for 3.2 GW of capacity. Our annual import bill could fund a similar plant every 1.5 years.

SMR fleet: Estimates suggest SMRs might cost £2-3 billion per unit. Our annual import bill could fund 8-12 SMRs every single year.

Renewable + storage buildout: If renewables plus storage is the preferred path, £24.3bn/year could fund massive deployment far exceeding current installation rates.

Grid infrastructure: Upgrading transmission networks, improving interconnection between regions, and hardening against climate impacts could all be funded from what we instead spend on imports.

Energy efficiency: Home insulation, industrial efficiency improvements, and demand management systems (proven technologies that reduce energy consumption) could be deployed nationwide.

Instead, we’re sending £24.3 billion overseas. Every. Single. Year.

Employment Impact

The North Sea employment story is stark:

2013: 441,000 jobs in UK oil and gas sector
2023: 213,000 jobs

More than halved in a decade. These were highly-skilled, well-paid jobs in engineering, operations, and support services.

The official response is that renewable energy will create replacement jobs. And indeed, offshore wind is employing thousands. But many renewable energy components (turbines, solar panels, batteries) are manufactured overseas. The jobs multiplier isn’t equivalent.

Nuclear energy, by contrast, has an exceptionally high jobs multiplier. SMR construction and operation would create long-term employment that cannot be outsourced. Yet we’re only now beginning to rebuild that capacity.

The Path Forward: Energy Independence Is a Choice

Britain’s 40% energy import dependency is not inevitable. It’s not a natural consequence of geography or resources. It’s a policy choice, one that can be reversed.

Not Anti-Renewable, Pro-Independence

Let’s be absolutely clear: this is not an argument against renewable energy. Wind and solar should continue to be deployed. They’re becoming cheaper, they reduce emissions, and they provide valuable generating capacity.

But renewables alone cannot deliver energy independence. The evidence is unambiguous: Britain has achieved record renewable deployment while simultaneously increasing import dependency. The notion that we can simply build more wind and solar and imports will magically disappear is contradicted by two decades of data.

Strategic Priorities for Energy Independence

1. Accelerate SMR deployment

The Rolls-Royce SMR program needs to move faster. Planning reforms announced for February 2025 are a start, but more is needed. Streamlined regulatory approval for standardized designs, multiple sites under development simultaneously (not sequential), government support for supply chain development, and realistic but ambitious timeline targets (operational before 2035).

2. Extend existing nuclear plant lifetimes

Every year we can safely extend operation of existing nuclear plants is a year of domestic baseload power instead of imports. Safety must be paramount, but where plants can operate longer, they should.

3. Honest accounting on biomass

Stop classifying imported wood pellets as “domestic renewable energy.” If 95% of fuel is imported, it’s import dependency regardless of the carbon accounting gymnastics. Either transition Drax to genuine domestic fuel sources or acknowledge it for what it is: imported energy.

4. Grid-scale storage investment

If the long-term vision is high-renewable penetration, storage at terawatt-hour scale is mandatory. This requires both technological development and massive capital investment. The government should be clear about timelines, costs, and whether it’s realistic.

5. Demand flexibility and efficiency

The cheapest energy is energy not used. Nationwide insulation programs, industrial efficiency standards, and demand flexibility mechanisms can reduce overall energy requirements and smooth renewable intermittency.

6. North Sea policy reality check

The current government policy is no new North Sea exploration licensing. Whether you support or oppose this on climate grounds, it must be acknowledged: it increases import dependency. If we’re not extracting domestic gas, we’re importing it from elsewhere. The emissions may simply move, not decrease.

Political Reality

Labour government (current): No new North Sea licensing, SMR support, renewable acceleration Conservative opposition: More domestic extraction, nuclear support, critique of net zero timeline

Neither approach adequately addresses the nuclear gap of the past 20 years. Both parties support SMRs now, but that’s planning for 2035+. What about the £24.3bn we’re spending on imports right now?

The political consensus seems to be: Accept import dependency as transitional, build SMRs eventually, hope renewables plus storage solve it someday. That’s not a strategy for energy independence—it’s a hope masquerading as policy.

The 2030 Clean Power Target: Realistic?

The government’s stated goal is a “clean power system” by 2030. Based on current trajectories:

Renewable deployment: On track to continue growing Nuclear capacity: Will decline further as old plants close before SMRs open Gas backup requirement: Will remain necessary for grid stability Import dependency: Likely to persist or increase

Clean power by 2030 is achievable if you count imported biomass, accept gas as a “transition fuel,” and don’t count imported gas or imported fuel for backup generation. In other words: achievable on paper, not in reality.

Conclusion: Energy Independence Is National Security

Energy import dependency isn’t primarily an environmental issue. It’s an economic and national security issue that happens to have environmental implications.

Every year Britain sends £24.3 billion overseas for energy we could generate domestically. Every year we expose our economy to price shocks, currency risk, and geopolitical instability. Every year we demonstrate that energy independence is not a priority.

This didn’t have to happen. Britain had nuclear capacity. We had North Sea resources. We had the industrial expertise and the financial capacity. We chose to let nuclear decline without replacement. We chose to import over 80% of our “renewable” biomass. We chose to depend on foreign gas for backup power.

These were choices. They can be reversed.

The path forward requires intellectual honesty:

Renewables are valuable but cannot provide baseload power
Storage at required scale doesn’t exist yet at viable cost
Nuclear capacity takes years to build (which is why we should have started 20 years ago)
Import dependency is a strategic vulnerability, not just a cost

Britain can achieve energy independence. Other nations have. France generates 70% of its electricity from domestic nuclear power and has the cheapest electricity in Western Europe. It can be done.

But it requires acknowledging the problem (which means acknowledging that the past 20 years of energy policy failed to deliver energy security). It requires treating energy independence as the strategic priority it is. And it requires building the domestic generating capacity (nuclear, renewable, or both) to actually achieve it.

Right now, we’re not doing that. We’re spending £24.3 billion per year on imports and calling it an energy transition.

That’s not transition. That’s dependency.

Data Sources & References

UK Government Energy Statistics

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)
Energy Trends: UK total energy
Historical energy statistics (1990-2024)
UK Energy in Brief 2025 (import bill data)

Import Dependency Figures

UK Energy Statistics 2023 (dependency ratio)
Energy Import Bill 2024 (£24.3bn)
Biomass pellet imports from North America (ONS analysis)

Nuclear Generation Data

Renewable Generation Data

North Sea Employment

ONS employment statistics (oil & gas sector)
Offshore Energies UK Economy & People Report 2024

SMR Program

International Comparisons

This analysis reflects data current to November 2025. Britain’s energy landscape continues to evolve, and this article will be updated as significant new data emerges.